一、主题：From Promise to Peril: Corporate Liquidity Effect of Performance Commitment Clauses in Acquisitions

二、汇报人：卢昱霏 2022级金融学硕博连读生

三、时间地点：2023年6月30日14:00，学院3号楼124

四、摘要：This study investigates the impact of performance commitment clauses in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on the corporate liquidity of the acquirer. Using a sample of Chinese M&A deals from 2007 to 2019, we find that firms signing performance commitment clauses in acquisitions are associated with lower liquidity, particularly in deals with incentive provisions. This liquidity effect is more prominent when corporate governance is weaker and information opacity is high, which we attribute to increased managerial optimism and risk preference. Furthermore, we observe that performance commitment clauses may increase the investment inefficiency and financial distress of the acquiring firm. Our research uncovers potential risks associated with corporate liquidity for acquirers when including performance commitment clauses in M&A.

撰稿：卢昱霏

校对：位锦

审核：魏旭